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We study the relationship between market structure and innovation in the global automobile industry
from 1982 to 2004 using the dynamic industry framework of Ericson and Pakes (1995). Firms optimally
choose a continuous level of innovation in a strategic and forward-looking manner, while anticipating
the possibility of future mergers. We show that our estimated model predicts the data well and that
changes in the modeling assumptions have a predictable effect on the key dynamic parameter -- the
cost of innovation. In terms of the relationship between market structure and innovation, we find that:
(1) At the firm level, there is a weakly positive relationship between a firm's price-cost margin and
its innovation intensity; (2) There is no relationship between competition and innovation at the industry
level in the steady state. As the industry goes through a consolidation phase, the relationship is negative
if competition is measured by the inverse of markups and positive if it is measured by the inverse of
concentration; (3) A key determinant of a firm's innovation intensity is its relative position in the industry
in terms of knowledge stock.
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Schumpeter [1942] famously advanced the argument that monopoly is more conducive to innovation
than highly competitive markets. An extensive literature investigating the eect of market structure
on innovative activity followed, but it has proven dicult to identify robust empirical results. Cohen
and Levin [1989] highlight several methodological diculties that have plagued empirical work. A
major diculty, as a number of theoretical studies have demonstrated, is that the competition-
innovation relationship is only monotonic under restrictive circumstances (Gilbert [2006]).
One reason for this is the opposing impact of the `replacement' and `eciency' eects. The
former leads to lower innovation incentives for a monopolist that has existing prots at stake. The
latter leads to lower innovation incentives in more competitive situations as competition lowers
aggregate industry prots. Aghion et al. [2005] demonstrate a nonlinear `inverted-U' pattern be-
tween competition and innovation, conrming the suggestive results of Scherer [1967] and Levin
et al. [1985] in an explicit model of rm optimizing behavior. At low levels of competition, more
competition is associated with higher innovation, but the eciency eect starts to dominate at
higher levels of competition.
A second reason for the paucity of robust results is the endogeneity of market structure. Vives
[2008] shows some robust eects in a set of empirically relevant cases, but results remain sensitive to
the assumption of an exogenous market structure versus endogenous entry. A related problem for
empirical work is reverse causality from innovation to market structure. The issue has been ignored
in much of the literature, although a few studies have exploited quasi-natural experiments that fea-
ture exogenous changes in market structure. For example, Carlin et al. [2004] follow rms from
transition countries over time as competition is suddenly introduced after abandoning the commu-
nist model. Aghion et al. [2005] instrument competition changes with policy variables associated
with the integration of the U.K. economy into the European market.
Several other factors can make it impossible to identify a stable empirical relationship between
innovation and market structure. The exact way innovation enters the model matters greatly.
Opposite eects have been demonstrated for product versus process innovations (Boone [2000a],
Vives [2008]), for discrete innovations that make an existing technology obsolete versus those that do
not (Gilbert [2006]), and for cases with or without complementarities between dierent innovation
decisions (Kretschmer et al. [2009]).
Identifying the relationship from cross-sectoral variation is complicated by variation in prot
opportunities and innovation costs across industries. Market structure variables often turn insignif-
icant if sucient controls are included (Gilbert [2006]). Blundell et al. [1999] rely on dierences
1between rms within an industry instead, but heterogeneity between rms is likely to be important
as well (Boone [2000b]).
All of the above factors are problematic for reduced form studies that regress a measure of
innovation on a measure of competition or market structure. Estimates will be sensitive to func-
tional form assumptions and to the controls included. In contrast, we propose to study the same
relationship in an explicit dynamic model of strategic decision making, an approach urged by Co-
hen and Levin [1989], Gilbert [2006], and Sutton [2008]. Instead of looking for relationships that
are monotone throughout an entire data set, we can focus on local eects and the model will also
suggest which controls are crucial. Two-way interactions between market structure on innovation
can be studied if the primitives of the model are estimated. In addition, one could even study how
the market equilibrium and innovation choices change if a parameter is changed exogenously.
We apply our model to the global automotive industry as it is a highly innovative industry, both
in terms of R&D expenditure and patents granted, and it has recently experienced large changes
in market structure. The widely varying fortunes of dierent rms have given rise to large organic
changes in market share. In addition, mergers have caused discrete changes in market structure
directly aecting more than two thirds of the rms in the sample.
Our principal objective is to study the response of rms in terms of their innovative activity to
changes in the level of competition|a combination of market structure and the level of innovation
of all market participants. We do this in an explicit model of industry dynamics that incorporates
several important features of the automobile industry.
In our model, each rm produces one dierentiated product that is characterized by two quality
dimensions. The observable dimension of quality is proxied by the patent stock of a rm, which
can be augmented through R&D investments. At the same time, R&D expenditures potentially
lower the marginal cost of production. The second dimension of quality, capturing something like
popularity of a new design, evolves exogenously and is unobservable to the econometrician. The
market share of a rm depends on the relative quality of its product and the price, which is set
strategically in each period. R&D investment is modeled as a strategic decisions: a rm takes the
actions of its rivals and their possible future states into account.
After each period, there is a probability that any two market participants merge. Mergers are
introduced as exogenous events, but forward-looking rms take them into account when making
optimal innovation decisions. Because knowledge stocks, the cumulative result of past innovation,
in
uence the division of a newly created rm's value over the two merging rms, the mere possibility
of a future merger in
uences innovation incentives for each rm and the interactions between rms.
A few other papers study the interrelation between innovation and market structure in a dy-
2namic model of strategic interaction. Goettler and Gordon [2009] study the microprocessor industry
and explicitly incorporate the durable nature of the good by making demand and price setting dy-
namic as well. As the industry has long been a duopoly of Intel and AMD, the impact of market
structure on innovation can only be assessed by a counterfactual analysis of monopoly innovation,
relying on the primitives estimated from the duopoly model. Their nding that as a monopoly
Intel would innovate more depends crucially on the durable nature of the good, upgrades are nec-
essary to stimulate demand. It only holds if consumers value quality highly and are relatively price
insensitive.
Xu [2008] analyzes innovation decisions in the Korean electric motor industry. In addition to
the cost of R&D, he also estimates R&D spillovers, adjustment costs of physical investment, and
the distribution of plant scrap values. As he uses the oblivious equilibrium concept of Weintraub
et al. [2008], there is no strategic interaction between plants in the innovation decision. Plants only
optimize relative to a stable industry state. Finally, Siebert and Zulehner [2008] study the reverse
question of ours, i.e. how innovation aects market structure. In their study of the DRAM industry,
they estimate the evolution of sunk entry costs as the innovation intensity and market demand
increase over time. Through their eect on entry and exit, these costs determine equilibrium
market structure.
Compared to these other studies we introduce two innovations. First, we model a continuous
control variable, innovation, in a dynamic context. Firms optimize dynamically, taking actions of
competitors into account. We use the two-step estimation strategy of Bajari et al. [2007] for this
dynamic game, which does not require to solve for the equilibrium|an impossible task for the 23
active rms in our sample.1 A second innovation is the introduction of mergers. It greatly increases
the computational burden as the linearity of the Bajari et al. [2007] approach is lost, but it does
introduce additional and exogenous variation in market structure. Through their impact on market
structure, mergers directly aect innovation incentives. Through their impact on the future payo
of current innovations, they have an additional indirect eect.
Another contribution of our study is to provide a parsimonious model of competition in the
global automobile industry. We nd that the technological knowledge of a rm, even after control-
ling for other observable product characteristics, is a strong determinant of the demand for vehicles.
This nding highlights the importance of innovation in this industry.
1This estimator has only been used in a few other empirical applications. Examples are Ryan [2006], who studies
the eect of environmental regulation on the cement industry, and Ellickson and Misra [2008] who study supermarket
pricing. Ching [2008] modied the estimator, simultaneously estimating the demand and policy functions, to study
demand dynamics in prescription drugs after patent expiry. Jenkins et al. [2004] also modied the estimator, allowing
the dynamic coecients to enter nonlinearly, to estimate network eects in the market for internet browsers.
3Parameter estimates for the primitives of the model are of plausible magnitudes. In the bench-
mark model, the key dynamic parameter|the cost of innovation|is estimated at $21.8 million
per patent application. Changes in the modeling assumptions have a predictable eect on this
estimate. For example, alternative demand estimates that lead to a lower price elasticity boost
the protability of patents. To still match the observed patenting rate in the data, the cost of
innovation is estimated 30-40% higher.
While the absence of robust monotone eects is a problem for reduced form studies, it is an
advantage for structural approaches. The richness of the interrelations between innovation and
other primitives, such as demand or cost, and other rm choices, such as price setting or entry,
can give rise to a variety of patterns. In terms of the relationship between market structure and
innovation, we use forward simulation of the model to illustrate that: (1) At the rm level, there is
a weakly positive relationship between a rm's price-cost margin and its innovation intensity; (2)
There is no relationship between competition and innovation at the industry level in the steady
state. As the industry goes through a consolidation phase, the relationship is negative if competition
is measured by the inverse of markups and positive if it is measured by the inverse of concentration;
(3) A key determinant of a rm's innovation intensity is its relative position in the industry in terms
of knowledge stock.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides background information on
innovation and the evolving market structure in the global automotive industry. The supply and
demand side of the model as well as the Markov Perfect equilibrium concept we rely upon are
introduced in Section 3. Section 4 introduces the data. The two-step estimation methodology and
the coecient estimates are discussed in Section 5, where we also examine the robustness of our
estimates (in Section 5.3). The estimated model is used to analyze the equilibrium interaction
between innovation and market structure in Section 6 and Section 7 concludes.
2 The Automotive Industry
The automotive industry is well-suited to investigate the interaction between innovation and mar-
ket structure in a strategic context. Demand estimates|see for example Berry et al. [1995] and
Goldberg [1995]|reveal that markups over marginal costs tend to be large, consistent with the
view that xed costs are important in this industry. Innovation is an important source of prod-
uct dierentiation as rms' competitive positions are improved through higher product quality,
greater reliability and the introduction of new product features. In addition, the industry is the
poster child for the importance of process innovations that continually boost productivity (Van
4Biesebroeck [2003]).
Developing and producing automobiles is a highly research intensive activity: in 2006, more
than 13% of all R&D in the OECD was spent in ISIC industry 34 `Motor Vehicles', more than in
any other industry. Statistics in Table 1 highlight the importance of automotive R&D in the ve
most research intensive economies. Except for the U.S. where it is fourth, the industry is rst or
second in terms of R&D spending in all countries. The top 13 rms in the auto industry spent
more than 55 billion dollars on R&D in 2005. The industry is also a heavyweight on the output
side of the innovation process. In the last 25 years, those same 13 rms were awarded more than
50,000 patents by the U.S. patent oce.2
The industry is concentrated worldwide, making it likely that rms will take actions of com-
petitors into account when deciding on their own innovative activities. In 2004, more than 95% of
all vehicles were sold by the 13 largest rms, which were active in all major regions of the world.3
The global automobile industry has seen signicant consolidation over the last few decades.
Many of the industry giants have found it benecial to join hands with some of their former rivals.
The mergers between Daimler-Benz and Chrysler and between Hyundai and Kia, the association
between Renault and Nissan and the takeover of Mazda, Jaguar and Volvo by Ford are but a few
examples of this consolidation.4 On the one hand, this consolidation is the result of increased
competition and high research intensity, which has made it harder for smaller rms to survive on
their own. On the other hand, consolidation has an impact on the intensity of competition as well.
With fewer rms around, standard economic models would predict less competition. However, the
emerging groups are more evenly matched in terms of research intensity and they are more likely
to compete head-on over their entire product range.
At the aggregate level, the equilibrium relationship between market structure and aggregate
innovation suggests that more competition is associated with less innovation. The raw data, in the
top-left panel of Figure 1, shows a negative relationships between the number of active rms and
the total number of patents granted in the industry. Patenting was a lot more intense in the last
years of the sample period, with 13 active rms, than in the earlier years, with 23 active rms.
The negative relationship is only slightly less pronounced if patents divided by revenue is used as
25% of all patents led in the European patent oce (by E.U. applicants) are in the narrow IPC category B60
for \vehicles in general", which is only one of 127 categories and contains only a subset of motor vehicle related
innovations; the corresponding fraction at the U.S. patent oce is 3%.
3We do not distinguish between minority share holdings and outright control. E.g. During our sample period,
Mazda is counted as part of the Ford group, even though Ford Motor Co. never held more than 33.4% of Mazda's
shares.
4The deterioration of the automotive market in North America and Europe has led to the reversal or reconguration
of many of these mergers, but that happened after the end of our study period.
5measure of innovation, as shown in the bottom-left panel.5
It is well known however, that the rate of patenting has increased over time in all industries,
especially after 1984 (Hall [2004]). If we purge the innovation variable on the vertical axis from a

exible time trend with a cubic series and plot the residual instead, the pattern is not as clear-cut.
Patenting now appears to be stronger in early years and the relationship between the number of
rms and the total number of patents becomes U-shaped. Using patents by revenue as innovation
measure, the relationship remains downward-sloping|less innovation when more rms are active|
but now at a decreasing rate.
The aggregates hide important variation at the micro-level. Not all rms patent equally. While
some rms choose to patent a little or not at all, others have consistently high rates of innovation
and invariably le many patent applications. Moreover, partly as a result of the mergers, there is
some convergence over time in the patenting rates across rms. The relationship between the size
of each rm, in terms of revenue, and patent stock that each chooses to hold is depicted in Figure
2 for four dierent years. In each period, the relationship is inverted-U shaped. On average the
smallest rms patent the least and hold the smallest patent stocks. The most innovative rms are
the ones in the middle of the size distribution.6
This pattern would be even more pronounced if patents by revenue would be used on the
vertical axis. It is consistent with the evidence for U.K. manufacturing rms in Aghion et al.
[2005], but in order to gauge whether the mechanisms leading up to this are also consistent with
their interpretation, we need a model of rm behavior and industry competition.
3 The Model
Our model follows Ericson and Pakes [1995]. We keep it as simple as possible to introduce a novel
aspect in the dynamic game: the mergers.
There are n rms, each producing a single dierentiated vehicle. Firms dier in their techno-
logical knowledge, !j 2 R+, and in a rm-specic quality index, j 2 R. For the industry as a
whole, the vectors containing ! and  are denoted by s! and s and s = fs!;s;mg, where m 2 N
is the number of consumers in the market. The vectors of ! and  excluding rm j are s!
 j and
s
 j, and s j = fs!
 j;s
 jg.
5Revenue numbers are relative to GM, obtained by multiplying the number of vehicles sold by the price relative
to GM (see below).
6The dashed line depicts the average statistical relationship between rm size and patent stock estimated over the
entire sample of all rm-year observations. The solid lines re-estimate this relationship in each year.
6Time is discrete. At the beginning of each period, rms observe s and decide on price and
investment in new knowledge. While pricing decisions are static, the investment decisions are
dynamic and depend on the current as well as expected future states of the industry. The model
allows for both product and process innovation. A higher level of knowledge may boost demand,
for example by improving vehicle quality or by introducing novel product features. It may also
reduce marginal cost by improving the eciency of production. The eect of R&D investment on
knowledge is the sum of a deterministic and a random component, capturing the stochastic nature
of the innovation process. The technological knowledge depreciates at an exogenous rate.
There is no entry or exit in the model, as was the case in the global automobile industry over
our study period (1982{2004). However, a rm may `exit' by merging with another rm. Mergers
are an important component of the model as they lead to discrete changes in market structure and
force the rms to re-adjust their prices and investments to to the new industry structure. They
happen for exogenous reasons, but rms take them into account when forming expectations over
future valuations. In the remainder of this section we describe the demand and supply sides in
some detail and then dene the Markov Perfect equilibrium of the model.
3.1 The Demand Side
We motivate our demand system using a discrete choice model of individual consumer behavior,
following Berry et al. [1995] and many others studying the automobile industry.7 Vehicles dier in
quality, which has two components. The rst component, !, is observable to the market participants
as well as the econometrician and is a proxy for the rm's technological knowledge. The second
quality component, , is unobservable to the econometrician, but all rms and consumers know
and use it in their pricing and purchase decisions.
There are m consumers in the market and each buys one vehicle. The utility for consumer i
from buying vehicle j depends on the quality of a vehicle, its price and the consumer's idiosyncratic
preferences as follows
uij = ! log(!j + 1) + p log(pj) + j + ij; i = 1;:::;m; j = 1;:::;n: (1)
! measures how quality conscious consumers are and p determines their price elasticity. The
price of vehicle j is adjusted for vehicle characteristics such as size and performance characteristics
as will be described in the data section. This procedure requires the use of log(pj) rather than the
price level and results in a CES demand system.
7We did not use a random coecient model because our main focus is on innovation and not on substitution
patterns or incorporating consumer heterogeneity. A practical reason for not using the random coecient model is
to save on computation.
7If we assume that the idiosyncratic utility ij is i.i.d. extreme value distributed and there is no
outside good, we obtain the following expected market share for rm j:8
j(!j;j;pj;s j;p j) =
exp(! log(!j + 1) + p log(pj) + j)
n X
k=1
exp(! log(!k + 1) + p log(pk) + k)
; (2)
where p j is the price vector of all other rms (excluding rm j) in the industry. The expected
demand is simply mj(). Each rm's demand depends on the full price vector in the industry,
directly through the denominator of (2) and indirectly through its own price which, in equilibrium,
is a function of its rivals' prices.
3.2 The Supply Side
We start the discussion of the supply side with the period prot function. We assume that R&D
investments only generate useful knowledge with a one period lag and that prices can be adjusted

exibly period by period. After observing the industry state, rms engage in a dierentiated
products Bertrand-Nash game, choosing their own price to maximize prots while taking prices of
rivals (p j) and the industry state (s) as given.
The prot maximization problem of an individual rm j is
j(!j;j;s j;p j;m) = max
pj
f(pj   j(!j;j))mj()g; (3)
where j is the marginal cost incurred by rm j to produce a vehicle. It is a function of the rm's
knowledge, re
ecting cost-reducing process innovations, and of the unobserved (to the econometri-
cian) vehicle characteristic, re
ecting cost-increasing quality improvements.
The rst order condition for rm j, after some simplication, is
(pj   j(!j;j))[1   j()]p + pj = 0: (4)
Since there are n rms, we have to solve n such rst order conditions simultaneously to obtain the




Fixing the functional forms and parameter values for the demand and cost functions, we can
evaluate (5) for any industry state s.
8Anderson, de Palma, and Thisse (1992, p. 136) illustrate how the CES demand system can equivalently be
motivated using the representative consumer framework. Without an outside good, the discrete choice approach with
unit-demand leads to the same demand equation, only the interpretation of the parameters diers.
9The existence and uniqueness of equilibrium in this context has been proved by Caplin and Nalebu [1991].
8The investment in R&D is a strategic and dynamic decision. Each period, rms choose their
investment based on the expected value of future prot streams. The problem is recursive and can









where  is the discount factor, c is the R&D cost per unit of new technological knowledge and xj is
the dynamic control, the addition to new knowledge. A prime on a variable denotes its next period
value. c is the only dynamic parameter in our model that we estimate. The solution to (6) is a
policy function xj(!j;j;s j;m).
The knowledge stock of the rm evolves as follows:
!0
j = (1   )!j + x(!j;j;s j;m) + !
j ; (7)
where  is the depreciation rate of technological knowledge. ! is a random shock that represents
the uncertainty involved in doing R&D. A rm that spends cx on R&D will, on average, increase
its knowledge stock by x. We assume that ! follows a well dened and known distribution.10
The other two state variables are assumed to evolve exogenously and we estimate the relevant
parameters over the observed period. We assume an AR(1) process with rm-specic xed eects
for the evolution of unobserved vehicle quality ,
0
j    j = (j    j) + 

j; (8)
where  j is the long run average quality of rm j. We assume a linear trend for the size of the
market m.
3.3 Mergers
Given the recent evolution of the global automotive industry, there is no need to consider entry or
exit, but we do need to deal with mergers. During the 23 year period we study (1982{2004), a total
of ten mergers, acquisitions and associations took place among the 23 initial rms in our sample.11
10This law of motion for the state variable is less general than in the main analysis in Ericson and Pakes [1995], as
depreciation is deterministic, but more general than in the example they analyze in detail, as we allow x to take on
a continuum of values.
11These were: Alfa Romeo-Fiat (1987); Ford-Jaguar (1989); GM-Saab (1990); Ford-Volvo (1998); Daimler-Benz-
Chrysler (1998); Hyundai-Kia (1998); Toyota-Daihatsu (1999); Renault-Nissan (1999); Ford-Rover (2000) and GM-
Daewoo (2001). In 2007 Chrysler and Daimler-Benz split; in 2008 Ford sold Jaguar and Rover brands to Tata Motors.
We ignore these splits as they happened after our study period, but they could be incorporated in the same way as
we treat mergers.
9There is no clear pattern, making the merger activity nearly impossible to predict. Several
small rms have been absorbed by larger groups, not unexpected in an industry with large scale
economies. But at the same time, other small companies are thriving in spite of incessant merger
predictions; Honda and BMW are consistently among the most protable rms in the industry.
Sometimes a merger is forced on a rm, as happened to Hyundai when the Korean government
wanted it to bail out Kia after the Asian economic crisis in 1998. There have also been instances of
two large rms joining forces in one form or another. The merger between Chrysler and Daimler-
Benz is the most recent such example and the association between Nissan and Renault is another.
It is especially dicult to model merger decisions in our simple model with only two rm-
level state variables.12 Because our main interest is in the innovation decisions, we assume that
mergers are random and occur with an exogenously given probability, picked to match the average
observed merger rate. We do impose that the probability of merging is a declining function of n.
On competition policy grounds, we further impose a lower threshold of ten on the number of active
rms and we disallow mergers between rms that had a combined initial market share of over a
quarter of the market.13
Even with this simple merger technology we need to specify the state variables for the newly
created rm and the way each rm incorporates possible mergers in the evaluation of its future
value. In the baseline case, we assume that the knowledge stock of the merged rm is the sum of
the individual knowledge stocks of the merging rms and that the unobserved quality is the average
of the vehicle qualities. We do perform a number of sensitivity checks for these crucial assumptions
and estimate the model under alternative assumptions which are discussed later.
To illustrate how rms incorporate mergers in their dynamic decision making, consider a simple
duopoly industry structure with rms A and B. Each period there is an exogenous probability




























B) is the share of rm A in the total value of the merged rm. We assume
12Even small rms can translate new knowledge into higher sales instantaneously, which precludes access to the
dealership system of a larger rm as a merger motive. Given that we estimate the policy function to be concave in a
rm's own knowledge (see below), gaining scale economies in R&D also cannot explain mergers in our model.
13This is consistent with Klepper [2002], who argues that the U.S. automobile industry has settled into a stable
oligopoly. We assume that the same will happen to the global automobile industry.
10that it is simply the ratio of the stand-alone value of A to the sum of the values of both rms in





















The approach extends to an industry with more rms, but the computations become more involved,
see the Appendix for details. In particular, with more rms there are many merger possibilities and
even if a particular rm is not involved in a merger itself, it has to incorporate possible mergers of
its competitors in its expectations. As a result, the last two terms in (9) are replaced by a series of
terms.
To summarize, in each period, the sequence of events is the following:
1. Firms observe individual and industry states.
2. They make pricing and investment decisions.
3. Prots and investment outcomes are realized and the industry state is updated.
4. A merger may (randomly) occur and the industry state is updated accordingly.
3.4 Markov Perfect Equilibrium
The Markov Perfect Equilibrium of the model consists of V (s), (s), x(s) and Q(s0;s) such that:
1. V (s) satises (17) and x(s) is the optimal policy function;
2. (s) maximizes prots conditional on the state of the industry;
3. Q(s0;s) is the transition matrix that gives the probability of state s0 given the current state
s.
Estimating the demand and supply parameters in the period prot function is fairly standard.
The one dynamic parameter in the model that we estimate, c the cost of R&D, poses a greater
challenge. There are at least two ways to proceed. The rst is to compute the Markov Perfect
Equilibrium (MPE) from a starting value of c and use maximum likelihood estimation to t the
observed investment decisions to the predictions from the model's Euler equations. Having solved
for the equilibrium, one can simulate the model and study the dynamics of interest. Benkard [2004]
uses such an approach in his study of the market for wide-bodied commercial aircraft. The main
disadvantage is the great computational burden, even prohibitive in our application with 23 rms,
of numerically solving for the MPE over and over.
11A number of alternative approaches have recently been developed to estimate the structural
parameter(s) of a dynamic game while avoiding the calculation of the equilibrium by assuming that
the data represent an MPE. As the observed investment decisions are equilibrium outcomes of the
game, they can be used to characterize the policy function and the state transition matrix. This
assumption is not completely innocuous. For example, rms might undergo a restructuring with
major adjustments spread over several years. They might not behave as in equilibrium during such
transitions. Moreover, if multiple equilibria exist, rms have to play the same equilibrium in all
periods.14
We adopt the two-step approach proposed by Bajari et al. [2007] as it is most suitable for a
continuous choice variable.15 In the rst step, state transition probabilities and the equilibrium
policy functions are combined with the estimates of the period prot function to obtain numerical
estimates of the value function by forward-simulation. In the second step, the minimum distance es-
timator chooses the dynamic parameter c that minimizes the deviations from equilibrium conditions
of the model.
4 Data
The sample period 1982{2004 covers most of the consolidation that has taken place in the industry
over the last few decades. The largest thirteen rms (in terms of unit sales) active in 2004 are
included all the way back to 1982, as well as the ten initially independent rms they absorbed.
Throughout, we do not distinguish between full and partial ownership ties, e.g. Nissan and Renault
are treated as a single rm after they initiated an alliance in 1998, even though neither rm obtained
majority control.
Figure 3 lists all rms in the initial and nal year of the sample. In 2004, the sample accounted
for more than 95% of global automobile sales. The remaining 5% of sales were made by a large
number of small rms, mostly operating in only a few countries. Since patenting activity of these
small rms is negligible and other information on them is spotty, we ignore them.16
To estimate the model we need data on the following four variables: gross additions to knowl-
edge, knowledge stock, market share, and prices. The gross addition to a rm's knowledge is
14For a review of the problem of multiple equilibria in these models and its possible solutions see Section 6 in
Doraszelski and Pakes [2007].
15Alternative approaches that avoid computing the MPE at each iteration include Aguirregabiria and Mira [2007],
Pakes et al. [2007], and Pesendorfer and Schmidt-Dengler [2008].
16The only sizeable rm in 1982 not included in our sample is AvtoVAZ (Lada) in the USSR. British Leyland in
the U.K. was part of the Rover Group and AMC in the U.S became 46% owned by Renault in 1979.
12measured by the number of patents applied for by a rm in a calendar year,17 taken from PAT-
STAT18. Since rms often le for patents through various subsidiaries, we searched the database
for all records containing the core of the parent rm's name and manually veried the results.
The number of applications of each rm-year observation to the U.S. and European patent
oces are combined as follows: xjt = max(xUS
jt ;xEU
jt ).  is the relative weight given to more
expensive and more demanding European patents. It is computed by taking the ratio of U.S.
to European patents observed for four large rms (Daimler, Ford, Honda and Toyota) that have
signicant sales and production in both regions. We compute this weight to be 2:36 and conduct
a sensitivity analysis with respect to this parameter.
We measure the knowledge of a rm by its patent stock. Using the number of patents applied for
by each rm for the period 1982{2004, we construct the patent stock using the perpetual inventory
method: !t+1 = (1   )!t + ~ xt.19 The series is initialized by !0 = x0
g+, where x0 is the number
of new patents applied for in the rst year,  is the depreciation rate, and g is the average growth
rate of new patent applications in the rst ve years of the sample.
Our empirical counterpart to sales is the number of vehicles sold worldwide by each rm and its
aliates. This information is obtained from Ward's Info Bank, the Ward's Automotive Yearbooks,
and the online data center of Automotive News for the most recent years. The market shares are
then the ratios of the number of vehicles sold by each rm to the total number of vehicles sold in
the global market.
Prices for the `composite' models are constructed by estimating a hedonic price regression for
all available models in the market. The log of the list price is the dependent variable and a rich set
of vehicle characteristics are the explanatory variables|see Goldberg and Verboven [2001] for an
example. We include a full set of rm-year interaction dummies and the coecients on these capture
the relative price for each rm in each year (the excluded rm is GM). We estimate the hedonic
regression separately for the U.S. passenger vehicle market, and jointly for ve E.U. countries.20
The weighted average of a rm's price in the two markets is the global price, normalized to zero
for GM in each year.
17Patents are widely used as a measure of innovation output. In his survey on use of patents as a measure of
technological progress, Griliches [1990] concludes: \In spite of all the diculties, patent statistics remain a unique
resource for the analysis of the process of technical change." [p. 1701]
18http://wiki.ep
.ch/patstat
19As mentioned before, the rm plans to obtain xt patents, but the randomness in the innovation process yields
the observed number ~ xt = xt +  of new patents, with E(~ xt) = xt.
20We have updated the data sets in Petrin [2002] and Goldberg and Verboven [2001] to 2004 using information
from JATO Dynamics.
13Figure 4 illustrates the evolution of these prices over time. After an initial increase, the price
dispersion fell notably, especially from 1990 onwards. The disappearance of several independent
rms with extreme prices, Jaguar and Mercedes-Benz at the high end and Kia and Skoda at the low
end, is the primary explanation. Another factor was the improved reputation, and coincident price
increases, for Japanese brands which caught up with and then passed GM. A second trend is the
gradual decline in the average price of GM vehicles initially, which reverses at the very end of the
period. The increase in the relative weight of its more upscale European brands, Opel and Saab,
partly explains the higher relative GM price. Another factor is the aggressive price discounting
that especially GM and other U.S.-owned brands engaged in following the 9/11 terrorist attacks.
It introduced a discrepancy between the high list and lower transaction prices.
5 Estimation Methodology and Results
We now describe the estimation methodology, which closely follows Bajari et al. [2007]. In the rst
step, we estimate the demand and cost parameters, the policy function and transition probabilities,
and use them to nd numerical estimates of the value function by forward simulations. In the
second step, we estimate our single structural parameter with a minimum distance estimator. We
present benchmark estimates and some sensitivity checks immediately following the discussion of
estimation methodology for the dierent elements.
5.1 Step 1
5.1.1 Demand and Cost Parameters
The demand side in our model is static and we can follow Berry [1994] to write the log of the
market share of rm j relative to a base rm 0 as21
log[j()=0()] = ! log[(!j + 1)=(!0 + 1)] + p log[pj=p0] + [j   0]: (11)
Using the observed market shares and data on the knowledge stock and prices, we can estimate
the above equation pooling all our data. To obtain consistent estimates, we need to account for the
endogeneity of prices. As rms use information about the unobserved vehicle quality in their pricing
decisions, prices will be correlated with the error term and OLS estimates will be inconsistent. In
particular, we expect the price coecient to be biased upward. We follow the identication strategy
21We estimate demand, cost, and policy functions pooling data across all years; time subscripts are omitted.
Throughout, we use GM as the base rm.
14of Berry et al. [1995] and use the sum of observable characteristics of rival products as instrument.
In our case, this boils down to the sum of rivals' knowledge.
A second complication is the assumed AR(1) process with xed eects for the error term j,
as introduced in equation (8). After de-meaning all variables to take care of the xed eects, we
follow a two-step procedure. First, the persistence of the shocks to  is estimated as the coecient
on lagged market shares in the demand equation. Second, we quasi-dierence the dependent and
explanatory variables in the demand equation and estimate using instrumental variables.22
To characterize the dependence of marginal costs on the state variables, the two quality compo-
nents, we estimate the rst order condition (4) jointly with the demand equation. In the benchmark










with ~ j = exp(j   0).
The estimates for the demand and cost parameters in the benchmark case are reported in
Table 2. Price enters negatively and with our CES demand specication the coecient has the
interpretation of the price elasticity of demand. At {2.35, demand is estimated to be less elastic
than in studies using micro-level data (see, for example, Berry et al. [1995]). This is consistent with
the more aggregated denition of a product. The residual demand for a rm will be less elastic
than for an individual model. The implied price-marginal cost markups are correspondingly lower.
Again, this is reasonable because at the rm level, as opposed to the model level, a larger fraction
of costs will be variable.
Estimation demand jointly with the rst order conditions for optimal price setting guarantees
an elasticity above unity, but our estimate is signicantly dierent from this bound.23 Weak
instruments or controlling imperfectly for the product characteristics in the hedonic price regression
would lead to an upwardly biased price coecient. Both issues do not appear to be problematic.
The impact of knowledge, proxied by the rms' patent stock, on sales is estimated positively
and precisely. This variable helps to control for some of the unobserved quality variation that can
lead to an upward bias and even a positive estimate for the price coecient in micro-level studies.
A one percent increase in relative knowledge stock is estimated to boost relative market share by
0.17 percent. A rm with a patent stock half of GM's, will on the average have a market share
that is 12% (= 0:17  ln(0:5)) lower than GM's, holding prices constant.
22A robustness check using the GMM-SYS estimator yielded similar results, but the system estimator is dicult
to combine with the joint estimation of the rst order condition.
23Estimation of the demand system by itself, without enforcing the rst order conditions for optimal price setting,
always produced estimates for demand elasticity higher than unity.
15Greater knowledge is estimated to have a concave eect on marginal costs. The linear eect
is positive. To incorporate the benets of increased knowledge, it is often necessary to introduce
new features into vehicles, which is costly. The negative coecient on the squared knowledge term
indicates that the marginal eect on costs decreases as knowledge grows larger. Patents for process
innovations are one possible explanation for the negative coecient, if they are more prevalent for
highly innovative rms.
The negative relationship between marginal costs and the unobserved quality term () is less
intuitive. It suggests that rms are able to produce higher quality vehicles at lower costs. The
point estimate on the squared term comes in positive, but it is not signicantly dierent from zero
and of very small magnitude. This quality dimension could capture an attractive design or another
feature that might require high xed costs, but does not increase the marginal production costs.
The estimates in Table 2 will be used in the benchmark estimation of the dynamic parameter
c. A number of sensitivity checks will be performed using alternative estimators or specications
for demand and costs. These results are summarized in Table 3.
The rst column reports estimates where no instruments are used for price in the demand
equation. It leads to a less elastic demand and a higher coecient for knowledge. Both eects
are as expected because rms will price quality vehicles higher. Note that this change also has
eects on the cost parameters. All coecients retain their signs, but the absolute magnitudes of
the parameters on the knowledge variables are lower and those on the  variables are higher.
In column (2), the unobserved vehicle quality is modeled as constant over time. It eliminates the
AR(1) process for the error term in the demand equation and allows for a much simpler estimation
procedure. The impact of knowledge on market share is estimated to be a lot stronger, with little
change in the demand elasticity. In the marginal cost equation, the impact of quality is now solely
identied from variation across rms, eliminating variation over time. It enhances the estimated
negative eect of  on marginal costs, but also leads to a negative eect of knowledge on costs.
The high observed correlation between  and !, 0.71 in the benchmark case, explains the spillover
eects on the parameters on the knowledge variables, as these now pick up all variation over time.
In columns (3) and (4) the functional form of the marginal cost equation is varied. A linear
specication highlights the positive eect of ! and the negative eect of . A log-linear specication
does the same, only the eects will be reduced at high levels of knowledge or quality. In both cases,
the demand equation is estimated to be slightly more elastic, but the changes are minor.
165.1.2 Policy Function and State Transitions
To calculate future prots, we need to calculate future values for all state variables. As it is
computationally infeasible to estimate the optimal policy function for investments, we follow Bajari
et al. [2007] and characterize an empirical policy function using observed investment decisions.
Ideally, the control variable x should be modeled as a completely 
exible function of a rm's own
state and the full vector of its rivals' states that are contained in the industry state. Bajari et al.
[2009] discuss the resulting distribution of the estimator if this step is carried out nonparametrically.
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where ! j =
P
i6=j !i, the total patent stock of rm j's competitors. ej is an approximation error
between the innovation that the true policy function would generate and our prediction.
To avoid extreme values for the number of new patents when we use equation (13) to make
far out of sample predictions, the parameters on terms with third powers are set to zero. While
this is a restrictive specication compared to the optimal investment policy, which is an unknown
function of 46 continuously valued variables (two state variables per rm), the t of the regression
is very good with an R-squared of 0.938. When the equation is used to predict future innovations,
the values are restricted to be weakly positive.
The full set of coecient estimates are reported in column (1) of Table 5 in the Appendix. We
also report results for a restricted policy function with fewer terms, in column (2), and for a policy
function where the logarithm of the state variables instead of the levels enter the polynomials in
equation (13). These alternative specications will be used to verify the sensitivity of our results.
Note that a dierent policy function is also estimated (but not reported) when the alternative
estimates for the demand and cost parameters from Table 3 are used.
The state transition function for the knowledge stock ! is then given by equation (7). The
accumulated stock of past patents decreases exogenously in value with depreciation and increases
with new innovations. We assume a depreciation rate  of 15%, the same value used in the con-
struction of the patent stock series, taken from Cockburn and Griliches [1988]. It captures both
patent expirations and the economic obsolescence of older knowledge. In the robustness checks we
also estimate the dynamic parameter assuming alternative depreciation rates of 10% and 20%.
The stock of knowledge increases with the number of newly granted patents, which diers from
the desired number of patent applications in equation (13) due to the randomness in the discovery
and patent granting process. The error ! is assumed to follow a normal distribution with mean
17zero and standard deviation that is 10% of x. The addition to the knowledge stock will thus be
xj(1+!). A rm that aims to apply for 100 new patents in a particular year has a 67% probability
of ending up with 90 to 110 new patents.24
The unobserved quality terms  are recovered as residuals from the demand equation. From
the same estimation we also recover the  parameter in the AR(1) process for . Equation (8)
provides an estimate of the standard deviation for the shocks to , which is estimated relatively
small (standard deviation of 0.21) compared to the variation in  across rms (standard deviation
of 0.92). Shocks to  are however very persistent, with a decay parameter of 0.81. In the robustness
checks, we verify the impact of eliminating the time-variation in .
An important feature of the estimated policy and transition functions is that when the industry
evolution is simulated forward, the estimated number of new patent applications does not increase
without bound. After some transition period, the industry settles in a (stochastic) steady state,
where rms' stock of patents hoover around a certain value, which will dier across rms. The
actual number of new patent applications in each year will vary with the random shocks to the
innovation process and to the transition process for .
The nal ingredient in the computation of future prots is a prediction of the future size of the
industry. We estimate a linear trend for (global) industry sales over our sample period and nd an
annual addition of 781,000 vehicles per year.
5.1.3 Computation of the Value Function
Combining the previous building blocks with a vector of dynamic parameters , we can calculate
an estimate for the value function from any state (!j;j;s j;m). In our model,  consists of a
single parameter: c, the R&D cost required to obtain one new patent in expectation. For now,
the evaluation of the value function will be conditional on a starting value c0. In step 2 below,
we use the equilibrium conditions of the model in a minimum distance estimator to estimate this
parameter.
To evaluate the value function we use forward simulations. We rst explain this procedure in
the case without mergers. For an initial industry state s0, the estimated demand and cost equations
allow the calculation of the equilibrium price vector from the system of rst-order conditions (4).
The estimated policy function directly determines optimal innovation. Substituting these in the
24An alternative approach would be to dene the control x as the value of R&D expenditures. We could then
estimate a patent production function !t = f(!t 1;x;) from the data, and let knowledge evolve according to
!t = (1   )!t 1 + !t. In our approach, the cost of innovation is estimated at cx and we will compare this with
observed R&D expenditures as a reality check.
18equilibrium period prot (5) for all active rms gives the net prot vector: 0(s0)   c0x0(s0).
Next, we use the state transition functions to nd the industry state for the next period s1. We
draw random errors, ! and , for each active rm, which determine the future states according
to equations (7) and (8). Following the same steps as above we can compute the expected net
prot in period 1 as 1(s1) c0x1(s1), which is discounted back to period 0 using a discount factor
. The benchmark value for  is 0:92, but we later report sensitivity analysis with respect to this
parameter.
This process is repeated T periods, until T gets arbitrarily close to zero. In the benchmark
estimation we set T to 150 periods and construct the value functions as the present discounted
value of the prot streams.25
In sum, we evaluate the following equation:







where the expectation is over future states. We perform these forward simulations many times,
using dierent draws on the error terms (! and ), the only sources of uncertainty in the model.
The average is the numerical estimate of V (s0j).
This algorithm becomes more complicated in the presence of mergers. At the end of each period,
all rms receive a draw from the uniform distribution over the unit interval. If in some period two
rms receive a draw below p, they merge. The value for p is calculated in the Appendix to match
the observed merger frequency pm, which was 10/23 over the sample period, and to generate a
declining probability of merging if the number of active rms shrinks.
After a merger, the ! and  of the merged rm are, respectively, the sum and the average of
the values for the individual rms. This changes the state of the industry in all calculations from
that point onwards. Below, we report robustness checks using alternative assumptions to construct
the state values for the newly merged rm.
To divide the future prots of the merged rm to the value functions of each of the merging
rms, we use the share of each rm in the combined value should they have remained independent|
according to equation (10). This still requires the calculation of future patent stocks for all rms
and the prots for the two merging rms as if the merger had not taken place in all future periods.
It proved computationally infeasible to perform these calculations allowing for further mergers in
the future. Instead, the  terms are calculated using value function realizations in the absence of
any mergers.
25The estimate for c is virtually unchanged if T is increased beyond 150, but the computation burden rises pro-
portionally.
19The randomly occurring mergers add an important new source of randomness to the forward
simulation of values. The estimate for c only became invariant to starting values under two con-
ditions. We increased the number of error sequences (including mergers) that we average over in
the calculation of the expected value function in equation (14) to 300. To avoid excessively con-
centrated market structures, mergers are only allowed if the sum of the initial market shares of the
merging rms did not exceed one quarter and if at least ten independent rms remain.
5.2 Step 2
In step 2 we use the results from the rst stage together with the equilibrium conditions on the
MPE to recover the dynamic parameter of the model. It assumes that the model is identied
and there is a unique true parameter vector . Bajari et al. [2007] propose a minimum distance
estimator for this true parameter vector. Let x(s) be the equilibrium policy prole. For this to be
a MPE policy prole, it must be true that for all rms, all states, and all alternative policy proles
x0(s)
Vj(s;x(s);)  Vj(s;x0(s);); (15)
where x0 6= x only at the jth element, while all other rms play their Nash strategy. Equation (15)
will hold at the true value of the parameter vector .
The minimum distance estimator for  is constructed as follows. For each rm j and each state
s observed in the sample, we use the forward simulation algorithm to calculate Vj(s;x(s);). We do
the same calculations for a number of alternative policy proles x0(s) and compute the dierence
d(j;s;x0j) = Vj(s;x(s);)   Vj(s;x0(s);). For a given value of , we calculate these dierences
for all j, s and x0(s) and compute the sum of the squared minfd(j;s;x0j);0g terms. Note that we
only consider the negative dierences because they imply a violation of equilibrium condition (15).
 is chosen to minimize these violations, i.e.







To evaluate the objective function in the minimum distance estimator, we have to specify
alternative policies to the equilibrium Nash policy. For each rm j and each industry state s we
specify two alternative policies as: x0(s) = (  ej)0x(s), where  is a vector of ones and ej is a
vector of zeroes with 0.01 at position j (both vectors are of length n). In words, the alternative
policies are to choose x which is one percent less or one percent more than the equilibrium policy.
The only dynamic parameter in our model is the (average) R&D cost of obtaining one new patent
(c). The benchmark estimate, using preferred values for all the static parameters and preferred
20specications for all primitives as discussed above, is an estimate for ^ c of 21.8 million dollars per
targeted new patent application.26 Using subsampling with 12 years of data and 20 iterations, we
obtain a standard error of 10.55 million dollars.27
5.3 Sensitivity analysis
A rst reality check for the $21.8 million benchmark estimate for the cost of innovation parameter
c is to compare it with observed R&D expenditures per patent application. For a subset of rms
in the later years of our sample we can calculate this ratio as it has become compulsory for U.S.
rms to report R&D expenditures on their annual 10-K form. With an observed average of $15.6
million and a median of $14.9 million, the R&D data seems broadly consistent with our estimate.
We also veried how robust the estimate is to dierent assumptions on functional forms for
various primitives, estimation procedures for static parameters, and other parameter choices. Re-
sults on all sensitivity checks are collected in Table 4. In each panel (a) to (g), one ingredient is
changed at a time. The assumption under the benchmark estimation is always listed on the rst
line, followed by the benchmark estimate. In subsequent rows, the assumption is changed and the
new c estimate is reported.
Results in panel (a) of Table 4 illustrate that estimating the demand system with OLS or xing
the unobserved product quality to a constant would raise the estimate. In the rst case, the driving
force is the much lower demand elasticity estimate, see column (1) of Table 3. As a result, rms can
charge higher markups and a knowledge stock advantage becomes a lot more valuable. In order to
t the observed rate of patenting, the estimator assigns a higher R&D cost to each patent. In the
second case, xing  to a rm-specic constant more than doubles the coecient on knowledge in
the demand equation. Again, to t the observed patenting rate in an environment where patents
are more valuable the estimated cost of patenting rises.28
For the results in panel (b), we revert to the benchmark demand model. Here, the marginal cost
equation is changed instead. We report results for two linear specications using the logarithms
or the levels of the state variables as arguments. Using logarithms, see column (3) in Table 3, the
basic shape of the quadratic specication can be maintained and costs are estimated to increase
concavely in ! and decrease convexly in . It is no surprise then that the c estimate changes only
by 21%|about two-fth of a standard deviation. With only the linear eects of the levels included
26This number is based on a normalized (real) price of $10,000 for a GM vehicle.
27The high standard error is largely due to the re-estimation of demand, cost and policy functions for each sub-
sample.
28Other (unreported) robustness checks conrm this mechanism. For example, including time dummies in the
demand equation raised the price elasticity estimate and the lower optimal mark-ups translates into a lower c estimate.
21in marginal costs, the dierence is even smaller, with a c estimate of $22.7 million.
In the Bajari et al. [2007] estimator for dynamic games, the policy function that characterizes the
observed decisions plays a key role. Our preferred specication, in equation (13), is non-parametric
in levels. We also tried a more parsimonious policy function, omitting all third order and some
interaction terms, and a third fully 
exible function with all explanatory variables expressed in
logarithms. Coecient estimates for all functions are reported in Table 5 in the Appendix.
The restricted specication produced a policy function more strongly concave both in the stock
of own patents and in the stock of competitors' patents. This had two eects. First, patenting rates
were predicted to be somewhat higher initially, leading to more rapid convergence of the industry
to the steady state. Second, in the steady state which is characterized by high average knowledge
stocks, stronger concavity leads to lower average patenting rates. Both changes contributed to the
signicantly lower estimate for the R&D cost of $14.3 million.
It is dicult to compare the policy function with logarithms directly with the benchmark
specication. The signs on many polynomial terms switched and the magnitudes of the coecients
are entirely incomparable. Expressing all knowledge stocks in logarithms before entering them in
the polynomials did reduce the estimated concavity of the policy equation, with opposite eects
from the changes with the restricted function. The estimate for c barely changed (dropped to
$21.0m).
In the benchmark model we assumed that when two rms merge, their combined knowledge
stock is the sum of their individual pre-merger knowledge stocks and the new unobserved product
quality is the average of the individual rm qualities. The results in panel (d) retain the rst
assumption, but change the second. Under both alternative modeling assumptions|using the
highest  for the merged rm or taking a knowledge-weighted average|the value of a merger
increases. This provides a rst boost to innovation incentives for rms as long as any future merger
is possible. Given that both ! and  enter the random utility in logs, the return to knowledge is
increasing in . The higher 's thus provide a second boost to innovation incentives even when no
further mergers are possible.
The results bear out these eects as both changes lead to higher estimates for the c parameter.
Picking the maximum  increases the estimate for c by 32%, whereas merely weighting the 's
raises the estimate by 24%. To some extent, these are overestimates due to the constancy of the
policy equation. Innovation is estimated to be increasing in own-, which is intuitive. However,
this eect is assumed to remain equally strong even as we calculate 's to be higher after mergers
in the alternative estimations.29
29When two rms merge during the sample period, we can estimate the new  of the merged rm and we have
22Next, we investigate the sensitivity of the c estimate to three parameters that were xed exoge-
nously. Raising the discount factor  from 0.92 to 0.94 or lowering it to 0.90 has barely any eect.
We nd the estimates in panel (e) to be slightly increasing in . A higher value for the discount
factor places more weight on the future, which is when the value of patents will be realized. It is
not surprising that it raises the estimate of c, albeit only slightly from $21.8 to $23.8 million.
In the calculation of the patent stock data and in the forward simulations, we used a depreciation
rate of 15%. A lower depreciation rate corresponds to a longer useful life span for inventions,
enhancing innovation incentives, and ceteris paribus this should lead to a higher c estimate to
match the observed patenting rates. However, the estimates in panel (f) of Table 4, suggests an
opposite eect. The estimate for c, the cost of R&D, is increasing in the depreciation rate.30
The reason is that strategic interaction in the innovation decisions cannot be ignored. The
direct eect of lower depreciation is to boost innovation, but this aects all rms similarly. As a
result, rms will more quickly reach an area of the policy function where the large size of their
competitors' patent stocks diminish own patent applications. Note that six of the nine terms in the
policy polynomial that include competitors' patent stock are estimated to have a negative coecient
in column (1) of Table 5.31 As a result, the net eect of slower depreciation is to reduce steady
state innovation and to lower the c estimate. A reduction in the depreciation rate by a third, from
0.15 to 0.10, lowers the estimate from $21.8 to $18.1 million.
When calculating knowledge stocks from observed patent applications, we treat European and
American patents asymmetrically. The application cost is higher and the success rate lower in the
E.U., leading to fewer but on average more valuable patents. Based on observed patenting rates of
rms with similar activities on both continents, we imputed a relative value of 2.36 for a European
versus an American patent application. If we use a ratio that is only half as large, the estimate
for c increases to $26.8m. On the other hand, if we boost the relative value of a European patent
by another 50% to 3.54, we nd a much lower value for c of only $13.0 million. The mechanism
is similar to that for a lower depreciation rate: it enhances the negative eect of competitors'
knowledge stock in the policy function.
used those in the policy function. An unweighted or sales-weighted average of the pre-merger 's provided the best
prediction, but with only 10 mergers in the sample period, this is necessarily an imprecise assessment.
30Note that we also recalculate the patent stocks in the data for the alternative estimations.
31In particular, the term on !j(! j)
2 is one of the most precisely estimated and it is negative, just as the uninter-
acted linear and quadratic terms of (! j)
2.
236 Eect of market structure on innovation
To study the eect of market structure o innovation using the estimated model, we need to compute
or approximate the Markov perfect equilibrium strategies of the rms for all possible congurations
in the state space. We can then use these strategies to forward simulate the industry from any
initial state to study the equilibrium dynamics.
6.1 Naive Strategies
Computing the Markov Perfect Equilibrium (MPE) of a dynamic game with more than twenty
players, two state variables and the possibility of mergers is not feasible.32 An alternative would
be to compute the Oblivious Equilibrium (OE) of the game (Weintraub et al. [2008]). Here, each
rm assumes the industry state is xed at some long run steady state and chooses its strategy
accordingly. In a rational expectation equilibrium, the strategies chosen by the rms will lead to
the same long run state of the industry that each rm took as given. The computation of the OE
involves nding the terminal industry state and then solving a single-agent dynamic programming
problem.
There are two important reasons we do not follow this approach. First, OE is a good approxi-
mation to MPE only when the number of rms in the industry is large and the long run distribution
of the industry satises a thin-tail condition. In our case, the number of active rms ranges from
only 10 to 23 per year and the four largest rms control almost half of the market. Second, our
model features exogenous mergers until a lower bound of ten rms is reached. In this process, the
unobserved quality dierences are updated by averaging across merging rms. By construction,
the eventual steady state will be a concentrated industry with ten rms of comparable size and
knowledge stocks. The optimal innovation strategy for rms in initial situations with many more
very heterogeneous rms is likely to dier a lot from the steady state innovation decision of a single
agent optimizing against a constant industry state. In addition, because of the need to average
over dierent random merger sequences, the computation of the industry steady state would also
be a lot more computationally demanding.
In the absence of a feasible or reasonable alternative, we introduce what we call naive strategies
as approximations to MPE strategies. We simply impose that each rm chooses its level of innova-
tion by assuming that the states of its rivals will remain the same. Clearly, if the industry is not in
32The computation suers from the so called `curse of dimensionality' and the size of the state space as well as the
computation time needed for one iteration in computation of equilibrium increases exponentially with the number of
players in the game. This is a well known problem in this literature. For an detailed discussion of the computational
issues in these models see Doraszelski and Pakes [2007].
24a steady state, these naive strategies are not equilibrium strategies.33 However, in our application
they are likely to provide better approximations to MPE strategies than the strategies based on
OE. Tomorrow's expected state (which we cannot compute) is more likely to be closer to today's
actual state than to the long run industry state. Once the industry is in a steady state, both naive
and OE strategies will converge to MPE strategies.
On the one hand, naive strategies are easier to compute than OE strategies because it is not
necessary to nd the terminal state of the industry. On the other hand, for each new state of the
industry that materializes, one needs to calculate the new naive strategies appropriate for that that
state, which adds to the computational burden. The forward simulations reported below took one
week of CPU time to complete.
Before simulating the full-
edged model using naive strategies, we compare in a highly simplied
version of the game the simulated industry dynamics for the naive and the optimal MPE strategies.
In particular, we limit the industry to ve rms and set the values of  equal to zero for all. We
discretize the state space for the knowledge stock to just twenty possible values, ranging from 300
to 2,200 in increments of one hundred. We compute the two dierent strategies of this game, and
simulate the industry forward from the following initial state s0 = [2200 1800 1400 1000 600].
The evolution of knowledge for each of the ve rms under MPE strategies is shown in the
top panel of Figure 5. The comparable evolution for the naive strategies is calculated iteratively,
updating the industry state after each period, and depicted in the bottom panel.34 In both cases
the industry converges to a steady state in about 12 periods. Without intrinsic rm heterogeneity|
rms share the same |all rms converge to the same average knowledge stock. The coarse state
space required to compute MPE strategies leads to an identical stock of 600 patents for all rms
in that case. Under the naive strategies, the randomness in the innovation process leads to some
residual variation around the 600 mark. The evolution and relative knowledge positions of the
dierent rms are very similar under the two scenarios. For our simple model of innovation, naive
strategies generate industry dynamics that are similar at least in some respects to those generated
by MPE strategies.
33A simple equilibrium strategy in this case would be for each rm to do just enough innovation to replace its
depreciated knowledge stock.
34In the latter case, we can allow a much ner state space and the knowledge stocks can take any integer value
from 1 to 2200.
256.2 Market structure and innovation: Forward simulation
We now return to the basic question motivating this study: what is the equilibrium relationship
between market structure and innovation? To this end, we simulate the estimated model forward
starting from the actual state of the industry in 1982. This will provide information how innovation
is predicted to evolve as the industry converges to a steady state.
We initiate the model with the actual !'s and the estimated 's for the 23 active rms. We
solve for the equilibrium price vector in the static pricing game using the estimated demand and
cost parameters. We assume that rms follow the naive strategies to determine innovation in new
knowledge. Randomly drawn shocks to innovation and unobserved quality are added when we
update all state variables. If a merger takes place, which is also drawn randomly, the aected
rms' states are updated further. This completes the simulation for one period. We repeat the
above sequence for fty periods and record a number of statistics after each period. Mergers are
allowed until the number of active rms is down to ten.
In Figure 6 we show the evolution of all knowledge stocks. Mergers appear as an up-tick in the
stock for one rm and the disappearance of the stock for another rm. For the particular merger
sequence reported, the industry reaches its minimum of ten rms after the 28th period. Apart from
mergers, equilibrium dynamics suggest a very rapid convergence to a stochastic steady state, which
is completed about ten years after the last merger. From that point onwards, the 10 remaining
rms still dier in long-term 's, leading to small average knowledge stock dierences. However,
the persistent dierences are swamped by the eects of the random shocks to ! and . The !'s
keep increasing over time because of the growing market size.
We now illustrate how this evolution is partially shaped by and feeds back into rms' optimal
investment policies. The relationship between competition and innovation intensity at the rm
level is depicted in Figure 7. Competition is measured by one minus the Lerner's index, increasing
to the right on the horizontal axis; innovation is measured by the ratio of R&D expenditure to total
revenue. While there is a lot of variation in innovation intensity for any given level of competition,
especially at low levels of competition, there is a discernable negative relationship. On average, the
equilibrium innovation intensity falls with a decline in price-cost margins. While this is consistent
with the classic Schumpeterian argument that market power is a pre-requisite for innovative activity,
there are other drivers in the model.
High levels of innovative activity tend to corresponds to periods when rms are trying to catch
up with a rival. This happens, for example, after a merger which gives one rm a large knowledge
advantage. In the absence of any adjustment costs, rivals will innovate a lot to catch up with the
26leader right away. Equilibrium dynamics also suggest that there is no real incentive for the leader
to innovate to escape competition. Because of our symmetric demand model with concave eects
of knowledge on consumer utility, the marginal benet of innovation will fall below the (constant)
marginal cost rst for the knowledge leader. Persistent  dierences modify this tendency somewhat,
but in the merger process remaining rms become gradually more alike.
Another feature in the gure are the very low levels of innovation at the lowest observed levels
of competition. This corresponds to the periods when the current knowledge stocks of many rms
are above the steady-state knowledge. These rms basically stop innovating temporarily and let
their knowledge depreciate to the steady-state value. That also happens to most newly formed
rms for a couple of periods after a merger.
In Figure 8 we show the relationship between the same two variables, but averaged over all
rms active in a given year. The numbers next to each point indicate the year into the simulation,
starting with 0 in 1982.
As the industry was converging to the stochastic steady state|in the rst 28 points but ignoring
the years with intense merger activity (20, 23, 25, 26)|we observe a similar negative relationship
as in Figure 7. Average markups decline as the industry consolidates. This might appear counter-
intuitive, but it re
ects the greater symmetry of surviving rms as the industry consolidates to the
steady state. Outliers with high 's are absorbed in larger groups and rms with excessive !'s let
their knowledge depreciate. Although the number of competitors becomes smaller, they become
more evenly matched in both  and ! and the intensity of competition increases. This is one
example where a fully specied dynamic model can generate unusual, but reasonable predictions.
Once the industry has consolidated and reached the steady state, there is no further change in
the average level of competition, although there is still some heterogeneity at the rm level. The
average level of innovation serves to replace depreciated knowledge and to gradually boost knowl-
edge stocks as the market keeps expanding. The relationship between competition and innovation
at the industry level disappears once the steady state is achieved.
It is instructive to look a the relationship between innovation and market structure using an
alternative denition of competition. In Figure 9 we use one minus the Herndahl index on the
horizontal axis. This measure can even be calculated on the raw data, without a need for estimated
price-cost margins. The degree of competition is now estimated to decrease continuously as the
industry consolidates. The accompanying increase in concentration leads to a continuous leftward
shift on the graph. Again ignoring the merger episodes (20, 23, 25 and 26), the relationship between
competition and innovation is now mostly positive over the consolidation episode. The leftward shift
on the graph is accompanied by declining rates of innovation. Once the consolidation is completed,
27from period 29 onwards, there is again no clear relationship between competition and innovation
anymore.
7 Concluding Remarks
We construct a dynamic game-theoretic model of the global automobile industry that incorporates
forward-looking innovation and random mergers. We estimate the structural parameter of the model
using a new method proposed by Bajari et al. [2007]. Our application illustrates the usefulness
of their method to obtain parameter estimates where the computational burden makes calculation
of the equilibrium impossible and we highlight some of the problems we faced when implementing
their methodology.
After estimating all structural parameters, we use forward simulations to study the relationship
between market structure and innovation. Our ndings can be summarized as follows:
1. At the rm level, there is a weak association between lower markups and lower innovation
intensity. This implies a negative relationship between competition and innovation.
2. At the industry level, our model converges to a constant market structure with only replace-
ment innovation. During the transition period, industry consolidation is accompanied with
declining innovation intensity while markups decrease. Hence in our simulations the two com-
monly used measures of competition, price-cost markups and market share concentration, are
negatively correlated. The relationship between competition and innovation depends on the
preferred denition.
3. The convergence to the steady state makes a rm's relative position in terms of technological
knowledge a key determinant of its innovation intensity. In equilibrium, rms with higher
knowledge relative to their rivals tend to innovate less.
The trade-o between replacement and eciency eects that has featured prominently in the
literature does not appear here. In our model, new innovations add to the existing knowledge
without replacing it, eliminating the replacement eect. Existing knowledge depreciates at a xed
rate, which is independent of a rm's innovation decision. The eciency eects are present|
lower innovation rates coincide with lower markups|but they can easily be dominated by strategic
considerations. For example, after transformative mergers in periods 20, 23 25 and 26, the remaining
rms are faced with a much larger rival and they immediately boost innovation to catch up with
the leader (even if markups are low).
28A number of important features of industry dynamics did not enter our model, simply because
they are less important in the automotive industry. The market size grows at a constant rate over
time, typical of very mature industries. No new rms enter the market, which was the case over
the 1982-2004 sample period. Some emerging Chinese and Indian producers should be included
past our sample period. We incorporated mergers are exogenous events, due to their low frequency
and unpredictability in the automotive industry. Our modeling environment has the potential to
endogenize mergers, and we are exploring this in an application to another industry.
The absence of adjustment costs to the state variable, technological knowledge, generates un-
realistic dynamics. All rms can now adjust their knowledge stocks to a new optimal equilibrium
value in just one period. The only constraint is that the gross change in knowledge cannot be neg-
ative, which limits the downward adjustments to the rate of depreciation. Introducing adjustment
costs is conceptually straightforward, but it would increase the computational burden tremendously
as a second dynamic parameter would appear. We consider this to be an interesting and challenging
topic for future research.
The benchmark model has another unrealistic implication: mergers are nearly always value
destroying. The reason is twofold: the decreasing marginal returns to knowledge and the loss of
an independent rm. Remedying the rst eect fully would require a drastically dierent utility
specication. One alternative treatment of mergers that we used in the sensitivity checks, assigning
the maximum  to the merged entity, does allow for value-creating mergers by leveraging the higher
knowledge stock with a higher . The second eect could be remedied by leaving the number of
products in the market unchanged after a merger. The new rm would simply determine prices and
innovation jointly for both products, while sharing the full knowledge stock across all products.
The above limitations notwithstanding, we believe that this study is a step forward in the
literature on the interaction between market structure and innovation. In particular, we have
endogenized the market structure by allowing two-way interactions between innovation and rms'
competitive position. The random mergers introduce further exogenous and discrete changes in the
market structure, to which all rms subsequently adjust.
In line with earlier surveys, we believe that the relationship is industry-specic. While general-
izations across sectors are likely to be of limited policy relevance, the framework employed in this
paper provides a 
exible approach to study oligopolistic-dynamic interactions in other industries.
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32Figure 1: Aggregate relationship between innovation and market structure
Figure 2: Firm-level relationship between innovation and competitive position
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35Figure 5: A comparison of industry dynamics under MPE and naive strategies














Evolution of Knowledge under Markov−Perfect Strategies
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Figure 6: Equilibrium Dynamics: Evolution of knowledge stock (by rm)



































Figure 7: Equilibrium Dynamics: Relationship between Competition and Innovation at the Firm
Level


































30 31 32 33
34
35
36 37 38 39


















































Figure 8: Equilibrium Dynamics: Relationship between Competition and Innovation at the Industry
Level


































30 31 32 33
34
35
36 37 38 39


















































Figure 9: Equilibrium Dynamics: Relationship between Competition (1 - Herndhal) and Innova-
tion at the Industry Level
38Table 1: R&D expenditure by industry in the most innovative countries
(data for 2006, in bil. PPP)
Industry (ISIC Rev. 3) USA Japan Germany Korea France
Chemicals (24) 46.3 16.4 8.2 2.1 5.0
Radio, TV, telecommunications eq. (32) 31.2 12.2 4.1 13.3 2.8
Motor vehicles (34) 16.6 17.9 14.4 4.2 4.6
Medical, precision, optical instruments (33) 22.4 4.6 3.5 0.4 1.6
Oce, accounting, computing mach. (30) 7.4 14.1 0.6 0.4 0.2
Note: All sectors which are in the top three by total R&D expenditure in any of the ve countries
are included; industries are sorted by total R&D expenditure across the ve countries.
Source: OECD ANBERD database, edition 2009 (online).












Joint estimation of demand and rst order condition, with rm xed
eects and AR(1) process in the demand equation and using
competitors' knowledge as instrument for price.
39Table 3: Sensitivity analysis for demand and marginal cost parameters
Demand parameters
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Price -1.742 -2.175 -2.421 -2.534
(0.083) (0.284) (0.357) (0.375)
Knowledge (!) 0.195 0.385 0.187 0.168
(0.036) (0.023) (0.047) (0.048)
Marginal cost parameters
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Knowledge (!) 0.017 -0.086 0.083 0.058
[in logs for (3)] (0.092) (0.099) (0.015) (0.024)
Knowledge-squared -0.052 0.020
(0.040) (0.038)
Unobserved quality (~ ) -0.155 -0.439 -0.268 -0.024
[in logs for (3)] (0.053) (0.148) (0.042) (0.013)
Unobserved quality-squared 0.015 0.035
(0.007) (0.004)
All columns contain results of joint estimation of demand and rst order condition.
(1) Estimation is with OLS, i.e. without instruments for price.
(2) Estimation is with IV, but unobserved quality  is assumed to be constant.
(3) Estimation as in Table 2, but MC is a function of the log of the state variables.
(4) Estimation as in Table 2, but MC is a linear function of the state variables.
40Table 4: Sensitivity analysis for the dynamic parameter
(a) Varying demand (b) Varying MC
IV 21.8 quadratic 21.8
OLS 31.2 linear 22.7
constant  28.3 log-linear 26.3
(c) Varying policy (d) Varying A+B
non-parametric 21.8 average A & B 21.8
restricted (8 terms) 14.3 maximum A or B 28.8
non-parametric in logs 21.0 !-weighted average 27.0
(e) Discount factor (f) Depreciation rate
benchmark (0.92) 21.8 benchmark (0.15) 21.8
low (0.90) 20.7 low (0.10) 18.1
high (0.94) 23.8 high (0.20) 25.2




41A Appendix: The Merger Technology
This Appendix accomplishes two things. First, we write down the value function of a rm when
it has more than one rival. Second, we calibrate the probability of a merger in such a way that if
the model is simulated forward, the simulated number of mergers would, on the average, equal the
rate at which we observe mergers over the sample period.
With more than two rms in the industry and the possibility of mergers, the value function of
rm j is a generalization of (9). For expositional convenience, we assume below that there cannot
be more than one merger in a period. Let pm(n) denote the probability that a rm experiences a
merger at the end of the current period. This probability is an increasing function of the number
of rms in the industry (n) and constant across rms. k indexes a rm that j is randomly matched
with to merge and s0 jk is the industry state excluding rms j and k after the merger. The value
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The expression for the continuation value contains three terms. The probability that rm j
will be involved in a merger is pm. Since this merger could be with any of its n   1 rivals, the
probability of merging with any particular rival is
pm
n 1. The rst term sums over the n   1 merger
possibilities, while updating the state variables for the aected rms. The fraction of the total
value of the merged rm that is accrues to Vj is j, which is still given by (10).
The probability that rm j will not be involved in a merger the next period is 1   pm. Since it
is the same for all n rms, the probability that there will be no merger in the industry is (1   pm)
n.
The third term captures the next period valuation for rm j in this case.
The probability that there is a merger in the industry, but rm j is not a part of it must thus
be
1   [pm + (1   pm)
n] = (1   pm)
h




How many such mergers are possible? The total number of possible mergers (regardless of
whether rm j is in a merger or not) is n2 n
2 . This is the number of elements in the lower-diagonal
submatrix of an n  n matrix. Out of these, rm j could be part of n   1 mergers. Hence the
42number of possible mergers that do not involve rm j is
n2   n
2
  (n   1) =
(n   1)(n   2)
2
. ()
Dividing () by () gives the individual probability of each of those mergers, not involving
rm j. The second term in the expression for the continuation value of rm j sums the valuation
for rm j in the case of each possible merger of two rivals k and l, weighted by the (constant)
probability of each individual merger.
As discussed earlier, we set a lower bound on the number of rms in the industry at ten. At
the lower bound pm = 0 and (17) reduces to (6).
We now show how we can impute the probability that a rm will be involved in a merger (pm),
from the observed number of mergers in the data. Let p be the probability (same for all rms) that
a rm will be up for merger this period, which diers from the merger probability pm, as mergers
only take place if at least two rms are up for merger.
With only two active rm, pm = p2. With more than two active rms, the merger probability
is the sum of the following probabilities (if more than two rms are up for merger, we pick two at
random):
Pr(The rm is up for merger and 1 other rm is also up) = pPn 1
1





Pr(The rm is up for merger and 3 other rm are up) = pPn 1
3





. . . =
. . .
where Pn





pn(1   p)n k. If n is odd, the last term in the above sequence would be n 1
n Pn 1
n 1; if n is
even, the last term would be Pn 1














where O = f1;3;5;:::g and E = f2;4;6;:::g.
We have derived an expression for pm in terms of n and p. Next, we impute p from the data.
In our sample we observe 10 mergers in 23 years, so the expected number of mergers in any period
is 10=23. If n is the average number of active rms, we can force the expected number of mergers














where P(M) is the probability that M mergers take place, e.g. P(1) = (Pn
2 + Pn
3 ), the probability
that one merger will take place is simply the sum of the probabilities that out of n rms 2 or 3 are
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n if n is even.
(20)
Equating (19) and (20) allows us to solve for p for each n. Once we have p, we can use (18) to
calculate pm.
44B Appendix: Additional estimates
Table 5: Parameters on the polynomials (!j)k(! j)l(j)m in the estimated policy function
klm Dependent variable: number of new patent applications
(klm) (1) (2) (3)
000 49.443 (0.49) -180.2 (2.94) 718166 (4.56)
100 -0.242 (3.02) 0.137 (6.53) -6469.16 (1.42)
010 -0.002 (0.22) 0.021 (3.45) -215860 (4.51)
001 320.0 (0.93) -14.92 (0.20) 2873.89 (0.29)
200 2.45e-5 (1.06) -8.57e-6 (1.79) -233.087 (2.75)
020 -1.28e-7 (0.51) -5.55e-7 (3.77) 21757.8 (4.47)
002 491.6 (1.90) -7.780 (0.10) 1766.44 (3.58)
110 4.38e-5 (6.84) 3.84e-6 (3.87) 1284.05 (1.39)
101 -0.251 (1.52) 0.025 (0.85) -1095.49 (2.83)
011 -0.034 (1.17) 700.370 (0.35)
021 1.52e-6 (2.33) -100.754 (0.94)
012 -0.041 (2.77) -170.704 (3.25)
120 -0.83e-9 (5.69) -62.115 (1.30)
210 -1.57e-9 (2.07) 18.837 (1.87)
102 0.155 (1.71) -10.207 (0.53)
201 1.31e-5 (0.50) 0.387 (0.05)




Estimation by OLS; absolute value of t-statistics are in parenthesis. In columns (1) and (2),
the variables in the polynomials are in levels; in column (3) they are in logarithms.
45